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Abstract
Drawing on both similarities and disagreements between
the apophatic theology of Dionysius and Gregory of
Nazianzus, I will demonstrate how glossolalia can be better
understood through the lens of apophatic theology. Gregory
and Dionysius both recognize the failure of human
language, but each follows that concept to a different
conclusion. Dionysius switches from categories of
knowledge to categories of experience and focuses the
mystical life on ascetic practices in the hopes that they
promote an experience of God’s presence. Pentecostals, with
our emphasis on experience, often find a kinship with
thinkers like Dionysius. In contrast, Gregory of Nazianzus
switches from the quest for our own knowledge to a reliance
on revealed knowledge. Thus, while Dionysius relies on our
ability to experience God, Gregory relies on God’s ability to
make Godself known. We are unable to know God, except
that God made Godself known. The Father condescends to
provide the Law, a framework through which we
understand Christ. The Son condescends to show us the
Father. Likewise, the baptism of the Holy Spirit provides for
us the only method by which we can speak mysteries to
God. This method is a private prayer language, which is
often called glossolalia.

Introduction
“The Wise Man never opines, never regrets, never is mistaken, never
changes his mind.”1 This Stoic opinion of Cicero presents humility in its
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reticence to opine but also stubbornness in its reluctance to change. We
can see a similar humility in Dionysius the Areopagite. 2 He says, “[w]e
offer worship to that which lies hidden beyond thought and beyond
being. With a wise silence we do honor to the inexpressible.” 3 The
stubbornness is unfortunately often present among theologians today,
even if only unconsciously. Cicero was right to caution towards humility.
But the resistance to change is, in fact, unwise. Such hubris requires a
corrective. One such option is found in the apophatic 4 strand of theology
practiced by people like Dionysius. What follows here is a comparison of
the approaches to apophatic theology taken by Dionysius and Gregory of
Nazianzus. Drawing on both similarities and disagreements between the
two, I will demonstrate that glossolalia can be better understood through
the lens of apophatic theology. Humility need not lead to silence, as
Dionysius suggests. Wisdom is not silent, as Cicero believes. Through the
power of the Spirit, the wise may opine without regret, and change their
mind when they are mistaken.
The apophatic call to silence often results from the realization that
our language falls short. Gregory and Dionysius both recognize this
failure, but each follows that concept to a different conclusion.5
Dionysius switches from categories of knowledge to categories of
experience and focuses the mystical life on ascetic practices in the hope
that they promote an experience of God’s presence. Pentecostals, 6 with
our emphasis on experience, often find a kinship with thinkers like
Dionysius. However, this is not always worthwhile. Experience, while
important, can be unreliable. Peter Neumann suggests that
“[e]xperience should be thought of not so much as a source, but as a
means by which the ‘Source’ (God) becomes known.”7 Neumann’s
excellent study on Pentecostal experience has shown that Pentecostals
should be more careful “in their popular, and sometimes naïve, appeals
to experience of the Spirit as justification for belief and practice. The
history of Pentecostalism is tainted with charges (and evidence) of
triumphalism, elitism, and schism (often within its own ranks).” 8
Dionysius’s approach to apophaticism struggles in these areas as well.
In contrast, Gregory of Nazianzus switches from the quest for our
own knowledge to a reliance on revealed knowledge. Thus, while
Dionysius ultimately relies on our ability to experience God, Gregory
relies on God’s ability to make Godself known. Gregory’s approach to
apophatic theology then provides a much-needed corrective to
Ciceronian stubbornness while simultaneously avoiding the iterative
skepticism often produced by Dionysius’s humility. So, while we should
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agree with Dionysius (and Gregory) that God is beyond us, from that
point on we should follow Gregory.
We are unable to know God, except that God made Godself known.
We are unable to become acceptable to God, except that God made us
acceptable. As Mark McIntosh puts it, “theological ascent is dependent
upon the prior ‘descent’ of God’s self-disclosure as the cause of all
things.” 9 We are likewise unable to adequately pray to God, except that
God made available to us a method of prayer that is efficacious even as
our “mind is unfruitful” (1 Cor 14:14).10 At every point our knowledge of
and relationship to God is contingent upon God condescending to us.
The Father condescends to provide the Law, a framework through which
we understand Christ (cf. Gal 3:24). The Son condescends to show us the
Father (cf. John 14:9). Likewise, the baptism of the Holy Spirit provides
for us the only method by which we can speak mysteries to God (1 Cor
14:2). This method is a private prayer language, which is often called
glossolalia. 11 This concept is unfortunately lacking in theological
development. 12 Apophatic theology provides us with a helpful lens
through which to understand this Pentecostal phenomenon. It is to this
topic that we now turn our attention.
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Apophasis
Speaking of apophaticism within Orthodoxy, 13 patristic scholar Donald
Fairbairn says, “Instead of listing and explaining the attributes of God
(as Western theologians would probably do), Eastern theologians are
more likely to consider aspects of our world that show imperfection or
incompleteness and to declare that God does not have these qualities.
God is not limited; he is not temporal; he is not sinful, and so on.” 14
Orthodox theologian Vladimir Lossky put it this way, “All knowledge has
as its object that which is. Now God is beyond all that exists. In order to
approach Him it is necessary to deny all that is inferior to Him, that is to
say, all that which is.” 15 This theology by negation ought to warn against
an overly positive view of our ability to understand God. As Jaroslav
Pelikan has said, “[t]hroughout the history of patristic theology, Eastern
but also Western, this accent on the apophatic had functioned as a check,
and one that was often necessary, on the pretensions of theologians.” 16
Thus apophaticism at its best provides a framework through which we
honor our own limitations while also honoring divine self-disclosure.
From the Orthodox perspective,17 God is unknowable in ousia (God’s
essence or being), but knowable in energia (God’s actions). 18 Specifically,
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energia here refers to God’s self-disclosure. 19 Therefore God is knowable
insofar as God has made that possible. Dionysius puts it this way: “For, if
we may trust the superlative wisdom and truth of Scripture, the things of
God are revealed to each mind in proportion to its capacities; and the
divine goodness . . . alone could give an authoritative account of what it
really is.” 20 In other words, human knowledge of the divine is a result of
grace manifested in divine self-disclosure because only God can give an
accurate account of who God is.21
Placing the emphasis on humanity’s inability will hopefully prevent
the apophatic theologian from falling into the Platonic error of viewing
salvation as our unaided ascent to God, an error Dionysius arguably did
not avoid. 22 Humanity could not reach God on its own. In the same way,
humanity is incapable of understanding God on its own. Put simply, this
epistemic humility results from the realization that our knowledge of
God is a function of his grace rather than one of our ability operating on
its own. This is precisely where Dionysius fails.
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Dionysius23
It should be said at the outset that understanding Dionysius the
Areopagite is not an easy task. Noted Dionysian scholar Paul Rorem
affirms that “a perplexed reader is in good company, for the history of
Christian doctrine and spirituality teems with commentators and general
readers who have found the Areopagite’s meaning obscure.”24 In spite of
the difficulty, he was a favorite of such important theologians as Gregory
the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and Bonaventure.25 In fact, “[e]xcept for
the Bible and perhaps the works of Boethius, no writing of the early
Christian era received similar attention in terms of translations, excerpts,
commentaries, and even cumulative corpora that combined these
elements into veritable encyclopedias of Dionysian scholarship.” 26
Given such difficulty, it is not surprising that many interpreters are
conflicted about what the Areopagite meant. 27 For just one example,
Jaroslav Pelikan indicates that one of the chief roles of Maximus the
Confessor was to reform Dionysius from “speculative nihilism” to “a
concentration on the person of Jesus Christ.” 28
Read in isolation, it seems quite clear that Dionysius sees himself as
a bridge between Greek wisdom and the Christian gospel. 29 As a result,
his idea of salvation is far more Platonic than Gregory’s. For Dionysius,
salvation is an “upward ascent of progressive unknowing, rather than a
divine rescue.” 30 All humanity needs to do is try harder. Cataphatic
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theology seems to be no more than a useful fiction that is eventually shed
in favor of true theology, which must be apophatic. 31
What has actually to be said about the Cause of everything is this.
Since it is the Cause of all beings, we should posit and ascribe to
it all the affirmations we make in regard to beings, and, more
appropriately, we should negate all these affirmations, since it
surpasses all being. Now we should not conclude that the
negations are simply the opposites of the affirmations, but rather
that the Cause of all is considerably prior to this, beyond
privations, beyond every denial, beyond every assertion. 32

So, while Dionysius affirms that some statements are legitimately
true, the point of the Christian life is still an upward ascent towards
union with God.33 Even the things that are legitimately true are
ultimately transcended.34 John Anthony McGuckin, influenced by
Dionysius, says, “The ascent of the mind through affirmative declarative
statements about God (cataphatic theology) leads on the percipient
theologian to realize that ultimately the God who is above all essence . . .
is far above ‘all names that can be named.’”35 For the Orthodox, this
results in the apophatic theologian being “rendered speechless in an
‘ignorance’ that is far higher than the ‘wordiness’ of those who think
they have fully comprehended God.”36 This is Dionysius’s wise silence.
In The Divine Names, Dionysius states that the only language that
we should use in theological discussion is language that exists in
Scripture. He appeals to 1 Corinthians 2:4 for this, because the power
granted by the Spirit to the authors of Scripture allows us to “reach a
union superior to anything available to us by way of our own abilities or
activities. . . . This is why we must not dare to resort to words or
conceptions concerning that hidden divinity which transcends being,
apart from what the sacred scriptures have divinely revealed.”37
However, notice that for Dionysius the words of Scripture are used as
tools by humanity in their ascent to God. We reach the union by
employing the words of Scripture. “[T]he further revelation passes into
the cosmos, the more it will be clothed in words, interpretations and
theories.” 38 There is a place for cataphatic theology on the lower levels of
reality, further from the divine light and source of all things. 39
Dionysius says, “[t]his is the kind of divine enlightenment into
which we have been initiated by the hidden tradition of our inspired
teachers, a tradition at one with scripture.” 40 Not only is this hidden
tradition viable, but so is natural theology. 41 Dionysius begins with
Scripture, but only as a tool of ascent to God. Tradition and natural
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theology are rungs on that very same ladder. Indeed, the ladder itself
could only be called experience, as that seems to be the only common
denominator. For example, it is not Scripture, nor tradition, nor natural
theology that is the ultimate source of the names of God. 42 The
fundamental source is experience of the divine.
Eventually, even negations cease, as propositional content is no
longer useful or helpful, whether it is positive or negative.43 Ultimately,
for Dionysius, the “task of theology . . . is to pass by way of these signs
into the depth of the Mystery who speaks them.”44 It is “to leave behind
you everything perceived and understood, everything perceptible and
understandable, all that is not and all that is, and, with your
understanding laid aside, to strive upward as much as you can toward
union with him who is beyond all being and knowledge.”45 Notice the
focus is on personal effort, both in discarding all knowledge and in
ascending to the divine. This is how he uses the model of Moses in
Mystical Theology. 46 He is the pattern of our ascent. He “moves beyond
the trumpet sounds and the many lights . . . to transcend the bare sounds
of the scriptures and the material lights of worship.” 47 Again we see
emphasis on the ability to transcend, rather than a reliance on the
transformative power of the Holy Spirit. 48 Gregory’s response to this
approach to God would likely be:
A person who tells you what God is not but fails to tell you what
he is, is rather like someone who, asked what [two times five is],
answers “not two, not three, not four, not five, not twenty, not
thirty, no number, in short, under ten or over ten.” He does not
deny it is ten, but he is also not settling the questioner’s mind
with a firm answer. It is much simpler, much briefer, to indicate
all that something is not by indicating what it is, than to reveal
what it is by denying what it is not. 49
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It may be hard to imagine that this author is in any way apophatic. Let us
now turn our attention to him, perhaps one of the sharpest minds ever to
expound the gospel.50

Gregory of Nazianzus51
He was a key player at the Council of Constantinople, where he earned
the title the Theologian. 52 Gregory, along with the other two
Cappadocians, 53 appreciated an apophatic approach to theology. But, as
Jaroslav Pelikan points out,
40 | Spiritus Vol 7, No 1

they did not do so . . . in order to induce a kind of “sanctified
skepticism” that would leave the believer unsure of anything. On
the contrary, the purpose of the [apophaticism] in Cappadocian
spirituality was to affirm the oneness of God with the Logos,
through whose Incarnation “that which is completely
inexpressible and incomprehensible to all created intellects”
became that which “can to a certain extent be grasped by human
understanding.” 54
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This is not congruent with Dionysius’s theology. Gregory balances
our inability with God’s self-disclosure. We can only know God insofar as
God has made it possible for us. So, Gregory makes very apophatic
statements like this: “To know God is hard, to describe him
impossible. . . . No—to tell of God is not possible . . . but to know him is
even less possible.” 55 But the same Gregory also “set out a complete
apologia of how he saw Nicene systematic theology to be defensible” in
Orations 27–31 of the Five Theological Orations. 56 Gregory forged this
balance in response to his opponents who, not completely unlike Cicero,
were radically certain. They saw theology as a pastime for clever men
who wanted to solve difficult puzzles. 57 These men, Eunomius and his
followers, thought that “because God is fundamentally simple, he can be
easily understood.” 58
Gregory, along with the other Cappadocian Fathers, responded
strongly to this, emphatically indicating that not only was God not easily
understood, God was beyond understanding at all. Their motivation was
pastoral. Gregory sees theology as central to the life of the church. As a
result, those who are not holy are even less capable of understanding
God. This should dissuade the puzzle solvers, because their lack of
character inhibits their ability to solve any theological puzzle. Gregory, as
always, puts it beautifully: “I only wish they would display comparable
energy in their actions: then they might be something more than mere
verbal tricksters, grotesque and preposterous word-gamesters—their
derisory antics invite derisive description.” 59
Gregory also speaks of ascent, but not in a Platonic sense.60 Like
Dionysius, he references Moses’ ascent of Mt. Sinai.61 But far from a
Platonic charge for humanity to climb the mountain and see God,
Gregory pastorally warns of the danger of the ascent for those who are
not prepared. “He too shall ascend, but stand further off, his place
matching his purity. Is any of the crowd, unfit, as they are, for so
sublime contemplation? Utterly unhallowed? — let him not come near, it
is dangerous.”62
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Gregory also speaks quite strongly about our lack of knowledge of
the divine. But when he does so, it is not driven by Platonic philosophy,
but rather reverence for God and humble recognition of his own
limitations. The two keep each other in check. Cataphatic theology
encourages us because we can understand God. Apophatic theology
warns us that we cannot comprehend him.63 When we recognize our
place in the world with respect to God, we recognize that we
fundamentally lack the ability to describe God. But God has provided the
description. God has descended to us. The unknowable has become
known as a function of divine grace. Thus, to leave God completely
shrouded in mystery is to disrespect God’s own work of self-revelation.
So, apophatic theology need not be a murky skeptical pit from
which we are incapable of escape. It need only be a salve to our overly
inflated view of our intellectual abilities. If it is practically focused and
grounded in the incarnation, apophatic theology lies at the bedrock of all
theology for it begins with the heart of the gospel. We cannot reach God,
but nevertheless God has reached us. Our theological reflection needs to
keep this in mind. We may have great confidence of what we believe, but
that confidence must be tempered by a careful recognition that we are
not the arbiter of truth in the universe. “Our preaching is not vain, our
faith empty; it is not that doctrine we are propounding. Do not take our
frankness as ground for atheistic caviling and exalt yourselves over
against us for acknowledging our ignorance. Conviction, you see, of a
thing’s existence is quite different from knowledge of what it is.” 64
Cicero was wrong. Wisdom opens itself to change.
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Glossolalia
What does all of this have to do with tongues? First, we must define what
we mean by tongues. “Pentecostals themselves have most often defended
tongues as evidence of Spirit baptism and have placed little emphasis on
reflecting on what the continued practice of glossolalic prayer represents
theologically.” 65 As Macchia has pointed out, “[w]hat glossolalia means
in the context of the rich theological presuppositions surrounding the
experience in Scripture has been neglected.”66 Put simply, glossolalia is
often emphasized but seldom explained.67 In light of apophaticism, we
ought to understand glossolalia as an apophatic declaration that is
empowered by the Spirit. So, how can glossolalia be an apophatic
declaration?
Non-Pentecostal apophatic theologians prefer silence because God
transcends all language, all propositional content. While that is true, that
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is focusing on our language directed at God, not a partnership between
God and humanity wherein God provides words for us. These words
transcend language and propositional content. This is why Paul says that
tongues must be interpreted if uttered in a corporate setting. Without an
interpretation, the hearers are not edified. Instead, only the speaker is
edified (1 Cor 14:4). But the speaker’s mind is unfruitful (1 Cor 14:14). If
the speaker’s mind is unfruitful, then this edification does not consist of
propositional content. It cannot. If it were propositional content, then
the speaker could simply explain it in a known language without relying
on an interpreter.
Put simply, Paul is telling us that those who pray in tongues are
edified, but not in a way that they can explain. If the edification consisted
of rational thought, then speakers could explain themselves. Note that
Paul says precisely the opposite. “Therefore, one who speaks in a tongue
should pray that he may interpret” (1 Cor 14:13). Thus, glossolalia is the
means by which one participates in trans-rational communication with
God, communication that conveys mysteries to God (1 Cor 14:2) while
simultaneously building up the speaker. Since this communication lacks
propositional content, it is apophatic by nature. It transcends both
affirmations and negations. 68
As we have seen, the typical perspective from both ancient and
modern authors is that the height of apophaticism is silence. 69 There are
often experiences where we cannot know what to pray. As Abraham
Heschel has said, “in no other act does humanity experience so often the
disparity between the desire for expression and the means of
expression.”70 It is hard indeed to describe some experiences, especially
those found in Pentecostal churches. There are often times where an
experience with God is strong, but inexplicable. There are often
experiences where we cannot know what to pray. But as a praying
people, Pentecostals often find that silence difficult. As Stephen Land has
said, “Prayer is the primary theological activity of Pentecostals. All
worthwhile knowledge must be gained and retained prayerfully because
only the Spirit can lead into all truth. . . . All prayer is in the Spirit, and all
who truly pray continually open themselves to and receive what the
Spirit is saying and doing in and among them. To receive and to be
indwelt by the Spirit of Christ is to be a Christian.” 71 Gregory says much
the same thing.
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[I]t is the Spirit in whom we worship and through whom we
pray. “God,” it says, “is Spirit, and they who worship him must
worship him in Spirit and in Truth.” And again: “We do not
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know how to pray as we ought, but the Spirit himself intercedes
for us with sighs too deep for words.” And again: “I will pray
with the Spirit but I will pray with the mind also”—meaning, in
mind and spirit. Worshipping, then, and praying in the Spirit
seem to me to be simply the Spirit presenting prayer and worship
to himself. 72
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Perhaps silence is more appropriate than speaking our own words, but
certainly words given by God are better than either.
We have also seen that the gospel is at every point dependent on
divine condescension. As Ephrem the Syrian says, “Heat loosens the
onerous, cold Bridle—the silence of frost upon the lips . . . like the
tongues of the Spirit, which rested upon the disciples, with its heat, with
tongues, the Holy Spirit drove silence from the disciples. . . . Silence fled
[their] tongues by means of tongues.”73 Just as every other element of
redemption is contingent upon divine condescension, in Spirit baptism
the Holy Spirit provides the only method by which we can faithfully
speak mysteries to God (1 Cor 14:2). Thus, the supposed ‘“ignorance’
that is far higher than the ‘wordiness’ of those who think they have fully
comprehended God” 74 misses a vital experience of the third person of
the Trinity.
Glossolalia “found prayer to be a ‘two-way relationship,’ not just
talking at God, but God (the Holy Spirit) already cooperating in their
prayer, energizing it from within, and no less also responding in it,
alluring them again, inviting them into a continuing adventure.”75
Indeed, “Romans 8 for Coakley represents a kind of ‘deep prayer in the
Spirit’ that was espoused in early patristic tradition; it is a passage that
relates an ‘incorporative’ account of trinitarianism in which the Spirit
draws one into the triune life of God and by that drawing and activation
the Spirit is in some sense apprehended to be personal.” 76 Chris Green,
likewise responding to Sarah Coakley, says, “prayer is God’s first, and
then—and only so—ours. We cannot pray to God except as God prays
with and for us. Without the Spirit’s ‘sighs too deep for words’, our
words can never deliver the prayer our hearts by grace desire to bring
forth.” 77 In Coakley’s own words, “It is not I who autonomously prays,
but God (the Holy Spirit) who prays in me, and so answers the eternal
call of the ‘Father’, drawing me by various painful degrees into the newly
expanded life of ‘Sonship’.” 78 This does not entail possession, but
partnership. The Spirit provides for us the means by which we can
communicate to the Father. Our spirit joins with the Holy Spirit in the
groanings that are beyond words (Rom 8:26).
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This is a practical application of Gregory’s apophaticism.79 As we
have seen, Gregory rejects that we can know God on our own effort. As a
result, he throws himself on God’s self-disclosure. Glossolalia is the
divine-human partnership exhibited in prayer. This is not to say that
glossolalia is the highest possible experience of God. That is precisely the
error that Paul is correcting in 1 Corinthians 12–14. As Macchia rightly
points out, “[t]his does not mean that rational and literate theology and
worship is thereby made insignificant. If this were so, a theology of
glossolalia would be a contradiction in terms!” 80 Rather, glossolalia is a
demonstration of apophatic theology.
In spite of this, it would seem that in practice glossolalia often has
more in common with Dionysius’s apophaticism. But this is likely
because of a lack of a clear theology of glossolalia. Bereft of that,
Pentecostals default to an approach that is experientially focused and
lacks careful thought and explication. This is not to say that experience is
irrelevant or unimportant. “[T]he height of theology is not tomes written
but God experienced.”81 However, that experience is not simply a
mystically inexplicable encounter. It is that, but it is more. It is an
experience that provides relief when we do not know how to pray. It is an
experience that allows us to declare mysteries to God (1 Cor 14:2) that
transcend language. Finally, it is an experience that allows us at any time
to partner with the third person of the Trinity in prayer that edifies us in
ways that we cannot describe.
Apophatic theology is the heart of the gospel. We have no ability to
understand God, no ability to reach God by our own effort. We are
utterly hopeless. That is, except for God’s grace. God has chosen to reach
out to us and redeem us. It is for this reason that our very knowledge of
God cannot properly be the cause for boasting. All that can properly
result from our understanding of God is humble adoration. Any
knowledge that does not lead us to this conclusion is ultimately ashes.
The truly wise man hesitates to opine because he knows the gravity of
the topic. This humility is needed. But wisdom is not silent. Thanks be to
God that through the Spirit, we do not have to be either.
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